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NOTICE AND DUE PROCESS IN FEDERAL CLASS
ACTIONS: A REQUIEM FOR REVISED RULE 23?
By Duane W. Reno*
Civil rights attorneys and leading authorities on federal procedure
regard as virtually axiomatic the proposition that notice to potential class
members is not required in a class suit brought in federal court which
seeks predominantly injunctive relief.1 Yet recent decisions of the
United States circuit courts of appeal hold directly to the contrary. 2
These decisions demonstrate that revised Federal Rule 23, like its pre-
decessor, has failed to fulfill modem judicial needs.
This note undertakes to explain why the present federal class ac-
tion device set forth in Rule 23 has been found inadequate to meet
constitutional due process requirements, and to suggest revisions appro-
priate for the purposes the device was intended to accomplish. The
note first reviews recent circuit court decisions involving Rule 23
and identifies deficiencies which have been detected in the Rule.
The note then indicates how these deficiencies will prevent courts
from granting effective relief to victims of pervasive societal harms.
The historical development of the federal class suit is examined, and
it is shown that the legal fiction which was the traditional basis for hold-
ing a class judgment binding with respect to the claims and de-
fenses of absent members can no longer be applied. An analysis is
made of the binding effect which can be given to the class judgment
through application of doctrines of res judicata and collateral es-
toppel, and it is concluded that further revision of Rule 23 is necessary
before it can be a satisfactory vehicle for redressing group wrongs and
avoiding repetitious litigation. 'Changes to the Rule are suggested which
would permit achievement of these ends.
* Member, third year class.
1. "The Rule does not demand notice in the (b)(1) and (b)(2) actions... ..
3B MooRE's FEDERAL PRAcrci E 23.55, at 23-1152 (2d ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as
Moom's]. "[N]otice need not automatically be sent to absent members when the ac-
tion is instituted under Rule 23 (b) (1) or Rule 23 (b) (2) . .. ." 7A WhIGHT & MmLm,
FEDERAL PRACTim AND PROCEDtJRE § 1785, at 139 (1972).
2. See notes 65-70 and accompanying text infra.
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The Circuit Court Decisions
Class actions in federal courts are currently governed by Rule
23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended in 1966. Sub-
division (a) of Rule 23 states four prerequisites to the maintenance of
a class action: (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members
is impractical, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the
class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typi-
cal of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative
party will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. These
prerequisites must each be satisfied before a class action can be
brought.3
Subdivision (b) describes additional elements which must be pres-
ent. Subsection (b)(1) provides for maintenance of a class action
where the prosecution of separate actions would create a risk of incon-
sistent or varying adjudications imposing incompatible standards of con-
duct for the party opposing the class, or a risk that adjudications with
respect to individual members of the class would be dispositive of or
impair the interests of other members of the class. Subsection (b)(2)
provides for maintenance of a class action where a party has taken ac-
tion or refused to take action with respect to a class and final relief of
an injunctive nature, settling the dispute with respect to the class as
a whole, is appropriate. Subsection (b)(3) provides for maintenance
of a class action where questions of law or fact common to the members
of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members, and a class action would achieve economies of time, effort,
and expense, and promote uniformity of decision as to persons similarly
situated.4 The criteria set out in subdivision (b) are alternative rather
than cumulative; once the four requirements of subdivision (a) are
met, only one of the three subsections of subdivision (b) need be satis-
fied for the class action to proceed.5
Subdivision (c) sets forth certain procedural directions to the trial
court. Subsection (c) (2) make special provision for class actions
maintained under subsection (b)(3), where common questions of law
or fact predominate. The trial court is required to direct individual no-
3. See Advisory Committee's Note, Proposed Rules of Civil Procedure, 39 F.R.D.
69, 100 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Advisory Comm. Note]. See, e.g., Poindexter v.
Teubert, 462 F.2d 1096 (4th Cir. 1972) (class action dismissed for failure to show
claims or defenses typical of the class); Am. Fed'n of Teachers Local 1600 v. Byrd, 456
F.2d 882 (7th Cir. 1972) (failure to show that the representative party would fairly and
accurately represent the interests of the class); Gordon v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 467 F.2d
717 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (failure to show common questions of law or fact); Demarco v.
Edens, 390 F.2d 836 (2d Cir. 1968) (failure to show joinder is impractical).
4. Advisory Comm. Note, supra note 3, at 102-03.
5. Yaffe v. Powers, 454 F.2d 1362, 1366 (1st Cir. 1972).
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tice to all class members who can be identified through reasonable ef-
fort, stating that each member has a right to be excluded from the
judgment upon request, or to enter an appearance in the action through
counsel. The notice requirement set forth in subsection (c)(2) for
,,class actions maintained under subsection (b)(3) was thought by the
<Advisory Committee on Civil Rules to be necessary to satisfy constitu-
tional requirements of due process. 6
The Advisory Committee did not intend that the mandatory notice
provision of subsection (c)(2) should extend to actions maintained un-
der subsections (b)(1) and (b)(2) of Rule 23,7 and the Rule has been
Jinterpreted to that effect.8  To fulfill constitutional requirements of due
4 process in (b)(1) and (b)(2) actions, a discretionary notice provision
was included in subdivision (d) of the Rule.9 Subsection (d)(2) grants
the trial court authority in the conduct of all actions under Rule 23 to
require notice to some or all of the members of the class whenever nec-
essary for the protection of the class or otherwise for the fair conduct
of the action. This notice may convey information of any step in the
action, of the proposed extent of the judgment, of the opportunity for
members to signify whether they consider the representation fair and
adequate, or of the opportunity to intervene and present claims and de-
fenses or otherwise come into the action.10
Subsection (c)(3) directs the trial court to include and describe
in its judgment the persons embraced thereby. In actions maintained
under subsections (b)(1) and (b)(2), subsection (c)(3) provides
that the persons to be included and described in the judgment shall
be all persons whom the court finds to be members of the class. In
actions maintained under subsection (b)(3), subsection (c)(3) pro-
vides that the persons to be included and described in the judgment
shall be all members of the class to whom notice was directed pursuant
to subsection (c)(2) and who did not request exclusion from the judg-
6. Advisory Comm. Note, supra note 3, at 106-07. See Kaplan, Continuing Work
of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(1), 81 I-HIv. L. Rv. 356, 392-93 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Kaplan]. Professor
Kaplan was reporter to the Advisory Committee from 1960 to 1966.
7. The Committee stated that subsection (-b) (2) was intended to include "various
actions in the civil-rights field where a party is charged with discriminating unlawfully
against a class, usually one whose members are incapable of specific enumeration." Ad-
visory Comm. Note, supra note 3, at 102. If the individuals in the class cannot be spe-
cifically enumerated, it follows that they cannot be given the individual notice contem-
plated by subsection (c) (2).
8. See, e.g., Hammond v. Powell, 462 F.2d 1053, 1055 (4th Cir. 1972); Yaffe
v. Powers, 454 F.2d 1362, 1366 (1st Cir. 1972); Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express,
Inc., 417 F.2d 1122, 1125 (5th Cir. 1969).
9. Advisory Comm. Note, supra note 3, at 106-07.
10. FED. R. Cv. P. 23(d)(2).
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ment. 1 The rule does not expressly state that all persons included and
described in the judgment will be bound by it, for the binding effect
of the judgment was considered by the Advisory Committee to be a
question of substantive law that could not be prescribed by a Rule
strictly procedural in nature. 2 The Committee clearly believed, how-
ever, that a judgment rendered in accordance with the Rule, whether
favorable to the class or not, would be res judicata and binding as to
all the class members included and described in the judgment.13
Thus, inherent in the 1966 amendments to Rule 23 is the notion
that due process does not permit the members of a class maintained
under subsection (b)(3) to be bound by the class judgment unless they
have been given notice and an opportunity to be heard. However, no
similar protection is demanded for members of a class maintained un-
der subsections (b)(1) or (b)(2). This disparity invited attention by
the courts.
The Eisen Case
The issue of whether due process requires notice and an oppor-
tunity to be heard in all class action suits maintained under Rule 23
first arose in the celebrated stock exchange case brought in federal dis-
trict court in 1966 by Morton Eisen.' 4 The complaint alleged violations
of federal antitrust and securities laws, and described the affected class
as all traders on the New York Stock Exchange who purchased or sold
stock in odd-lots.'5  The size of this class was approximately 6 million
members located throughout the world.'" The potential amount of
class damages was at least $22 million.' 7
11. Advisory Comm. Note, supra note 3, at 105.
12. Id. at 106. "Subdivision (c) (2) makes clear that the judgment in any class
action maintained as such extends to the class (excluding opters-out in (b) (3) cases),
whether or not favorable to the class. This is a statement of how the judgment shall
read, not an attempted prescription of its subsequent res judicata effect, although looking
ahead with hope to that effect." Kaplan, supra note 6, at 393.
13. The Committee stated that subsection (c)(3) would exclude situations where
class members could wait until after a decision on the merits and then secure the bene-
fits of the decision for themselves if it was favorable, or elect not to be bound by it
if it was not, and that under the subsection questions as to the res judicata effects of
the judgment would -be "more satisfactorily answered." Advisory Comm. Note, supra
note 3, at 105-06.
14. For a more complete history of the case than that presented here see McCall,
Due Process and Consumer Protection: Concepts and Realities in Procedure and Sub-
stance-Class Action Issues, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 1351, 1357-62 (1974) [hereinafter cited
as McCall]; Casenote, Class Actions-Federal Rules of Civil Procedure-Rule 23(b)
(3) Class Action Requires Personal Notice to All Identifiable Members of the Class,
2 FLA. ST. U.L. Rv. 366, 366-70 (1974).
15. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 41 F.R.D. 147, 148 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
16. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 52 F.R.D. 253, 257-58 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
17. Id. at 265.
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The district court dismissed Eisen's suit as a class action, in part
on the basis that the class representative did not appear able to provide
the notice to class members required both by subsection (c) (2) of Rule
23 and by the general requirement of due process.18 In a decision
popularly known as Eisen I,19 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit adopted the "death knell" doctrine and held that
dismissal of the class allegations of the suit was immediately appeal-
able.20  For all practicable purposes dismissal of the action as a class
suit was a final judgment; the class representative's individual stake in
the damage award was only $70, and no competent attorney would un-
dertake a complex antitrust action to recover so inconsequential an
amount."'
In Eisen II22 the Second Circuit decided the merits of the appeal.
The order dismissing the suit as a class action was reversed, and the
case was remanded with directions to the district court to give Rule 23
a liberal rather than a restrictive interpretation. 23
One of Eisen's arguments on appeal was that notice to the class
was not required because his class action qualified under subsections
(b) (1) and (b) (2) of Rule 23.24 The Second Circuit rejected the
contention that either subsection (b) (1) or subsection (b) (2) was ap-
plicable to the factual situation in the case,25 but decided to address
the argument as to notice anyway. The court said, "we hold that notice
is required as a matter of due process in all representative actions,
and 23 (c) (2) merely requires a particular form of notice in 23 (b) (3)
actions. 26 As authority for its assertion the court cited the Advisory
Committee's Note to revised Rule 2327 and Mullane v. Central Hanover
Bank & Trust Co.,28 one of the cases cited by the Advisory Committee
for the proposition that notice to the class is required by due process
for actions maintained under subsection (b) (3) of Rule 23.9
18. 41 F.R.D. at 151-52. Other reasons given by the court for dismissing the suit
as a class action were that there was no assurance that the representative party could
adequately protect the interests of absent members of the class, id. at 150-51, and that
questions common to the class did not predominate over questions affecting individual
members. Id. at 152.
19. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 370 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386
U.S. 1035 (1967).
20. The order was appealable in. the same manner as a final judgment because as
a practical matter it was a "death knell" for the litigation. Id. at 120-21.
21. Id.
22. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968).
23. Id. at 563.
24. Id. at 564.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 564-65.
27. Id. at 565, citing Advisory Comm. Note, supra note 3, at 107.
28. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
29. See Advisory Comm. Note, supra note 3, at 107.
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On remand the district court held that the notice required by sub-
section (c)(2) could be met through a combination of personal notice
to certain selected class members and publication,30 and that the cost
of notice could be allocated to, or at least shared by, the defendants
if the plaintiff was able to make a strong showing at a preliminary hear-
ing of a likelihood of success at trial on the merits.3 ' After that hear-
ing was held the district court allocated 90 percent of the costs of notice
to the defendants.2
Another appeal followed. In Eisen II 33 the Second Circuit again
reversed the district court, and held that subsection (c)(2) of Rule 23
and due process require individual notice to all identifiable class mem-
bers, not just a selected few, and that the entire expense of notice must
be borne by the representative plaintiff.34
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the conclusion of the
Second Circuit with respect to the notice which must be provided to
absent class members,3 5 but was more circumspect in its holding.
Whereas the Second Circuit had said in Eisen II that individual notice
was required in all class actions maintained under Rule 23,36 the Su-
preme Court limited its consideration just to actions maintained under
subsection (b)(3). And whereas the Second Circuit had said that its
decision was based in part on constitutional guarantees of due process,3 7
the Supreme Court affirmed solely on the basis of statutory construc-
tion. The Court noted that the Advisory Committee had stated that
mandatory notice was required by subsection (c)(2) in order to fulfill
the requirements of due process, but held that it was unnecessary to
reach that issue in order to decide the case.38 The Court said that the
language of subsection (c)(2) was "unmistakable,"3 " and that it was
the clear intention of the Advisory Committee that the notice required
by subsection (c)(2) was to be "not merely discretionary" but "manda-
tory."40 The question of whether individual notice is required by due
process as well as by the language of the statute in class actions main-
tained under Rule 23 was left for another day.
30. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 52 F.R.D. 253, 267-68 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
31. Id. at 271.
32. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 54 F.R.D. 565, 573 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
33. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973), affd in part, rev'a
in part on other grounds, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
34. Id. at 1015-16.
35. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974) (vacating and remanding
with instructions to dismiss the class action as defined in plaintiffs original complaint).
36. See note 26 and accompanying text supra.
37. Id.
38. 417 U.S. at 176-77.
39. Id. at 173.
40. Id., quoting Advisory Comm. Note, supra note 3, at 106-07.
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On the question of whether the class representative must bear the
entire costs of notice, the Supreme Court held that Rule 23 gave the
district court no authority to impose notice costs on the defendant after
determining from a preliminary hearing that the class representative
was likely to prevail on his claims.4 Such a procedure contravened the
Rule by allowing the representative to secure the benefits of a class
action without first satisfying the Rule's requirements, and contained the
potential for substantial prejudice to the defendant by coloring the
subsequent proceedings with tentative findings made in the absence of
established procedural safeguards.42
The Progeny of Gregory v. Hershey
By the time Eisen reached the Supreme Court, two more United
States circuit courts of appeal had been confronted with the issue of
whether due process requires notice to the class in all suits maintained
under Rule 23 .4  The two cases presenting this issue were spawned
by the unrenowned but momentous case of Gregory v. Hershey.44
In Gregory, several selective service registrants sought a declara-
tory judgment that under the Selective Service Act of 1967 they were
entitled to and had been unlawfully denied fatherhood deferments from
the draft for the Vietnam War.4e They brought their suit as a class
action under Rule 23, purporting to represent all selective service reg-
istrants throughout the United States who were fathers and who had
received graduate student deferments but who had never received un-
dergraduate deferments.48 The district court held the suit was appro-
priate as a class action under either subsection (b)(1) or subsection
(b)(2) of Rule 23, and notification to the members of the class was
impractical because of the number of members and the absence of any
reasonable way of identifying them.47 The relief sought was granted
to the named plaintiffs and to the class they represented. 48
The national director of selective service refused to comply with
the district court's order, except with respect to the named class repre-
sentatives. As a result similarly situated registrants in several different
states filed suit seeking to assert the class action judgment and obtain
injunctive relief against threatened induction into the armed services
41. Id. at 177.
42. Id. at 177-78.
43. See notes 66-71 and accompanying text infra.
44. 311 F. Supp. 1 (E.D. Mich. 1969), rev'd sub nom., Gregory v. Tarr 436 F.2d
513 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 922 (1971).
45. Id. at 2.
46. Id.
47. Gregory v. Hershey, 51 F.R.D. 188, 189 (E.D. Mich. 1970).
48. Id. at 190.
RULE 23
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
by their local draft boards. In Pasquier v. Tarr4 9 a district court in
Louisiana adopted the dictum from Eisen II that notice to the class is
required as a matter of due process in all actions maintained under Rule
23, and held that since the class representatives in Gregory had not pro-
vided notice to a class member (who was, of course, perfectly happy
with the Gregory decision), the member was not entitled to assert that
judgment as res judicata in his suit seeking a deferment. 0 The court
said that had Gregory been decided the other way the plaintiff could
have challenged its binding effect on the due process ground of inade-
quacy of representation because the class representatives had failed to
provide notice.51 Therefore it would be unfair to hold the defendant
bound.5 2  To do so, the court said, "gives absent members of the class
two bites at the apple at the expense of the defendant." '
Other district courts reached the opposite result. 4 In Schrader
v. Selective Service System,55 a district court for the Western District
of Wisconsin held that the validity of the class action had been litigated
in Gregory, and that decision was res judicata as to the binding effect
of the class judgment.50 The court rejected the government's argu-
ment that it was unfair to bind the defendant by a class action judg-
ment when the plaintiff might not be similarly bound, stating:
A judgment in favor of the defendant, against the class may
not be binding upon the members of the class who later sue defen-
dant and argue ithat they were not adequately represented in the
class action. But the rationale for this view is that every man must
be guaranteed his day in court. This rationale has no application
to the converse situation in which defendants have had the oppor-
tunity fully to litigate the issues in a previous case.5 7
At this point the Sixth Circuit overturned the district court decision
in Gregory, and held that the named representatives and others simi-
larly situated were not entitled to fatherhood deferments. 5  No appeal
49. 318 F. Supp. 1350 (E.D. La. 1970), aff'd per curiam, 444 F.2d 116 (5th Cir.
1971); followed, McCarthy v. Director of Selective Serv. Sys., 322 F. Supp. 1032 (E.D.
Wis. 1970), aff'd per curiam, 460 F.2d 1089 (7th Cir. 1972).
50. 318 F. Supp. at 1354.
51. Id. at 1353-54, citing Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Grounds, 292 F. Supp. 619,
636 (D. Kan. 1968), and 3B MooRE's, supra note 1, 23.72, at 23-1421-23-1422.
52. Id. at 1354.
53. Id.
54. Whitmore v. Tarr, 318 F. Supp. 1279 (D. Neb. 1970), vacated, 443 F.2d 1370
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 922 (1971); Germonprez v. Director of Selective Serv.,
318 F. Supp. 829 (D.D.C. 1970).
55. 329 F. Supp. 966 (W.D. Wis. 1971), rev'd, 470 F.2d 73 (7th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 409 U.S. 1085 (1972).
56. Id. at 967.
57. Id.
58. Gregory v. Tarr, 436 F.2d 513 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 922 (1971).
[Vol. 2
Spring 1975]
had been taken by the government, however, of the finding by the dis-
trict court that the case was properly brought as a class action.59 Ap-
parently aware of the nationwide repercussions of the district court's
decision, the Sixth Circuit indicated doubt in a footnote that the class
judgment should have been given binding effect with respect to absent
class members. 60  Three reasons were stated. First, the notice re-
quired by Rule 23 was not given to the members. 61 Second, allowing
selective service registrants to bring a class action and enjoin not only
their own induction but the induction of others similarly situated
throughout the nation could have. a far-reaching and disruptive effect
on the operation of the selective service system.62 And third, if the
district court had decided the case the other way, its decision might not
have been binding upon the absent members of the class.63
The plaintiff in Schrader refused to admit defeat, even though the
class action judgment he had previously asserted had now been re-
versed. He argued that the judgment was binding with respect to his
claim to a deferment until it was overturned on appeal, so that the na-
tional director of selective service had acted lawlessly by failing to
comply with the judgment and ordering his induction.64 The district
court agreed, and held that the actions of the director were lawless and
void, that the plaintiff's draft classification must be reopened, and that
before being inducted he must be afforded the right of administrative
appeal which follows such reopening.65
The two Schrader district court decisions giving binding effect to
the Gregory class judgment were reversed by the Seventh Circuit,
59. Id. at 514 n.2.
60. See id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. Following the reversal of Gregory by the Sixth Circuit, the Fifth Circuit
affirmed the denial of injunctive relief 'by the Louisiana federal district court in Pasquier,
holding that whatever res judicata effects the appellant might otherwise have claimed
from the district court decision in Gregory collapsed when that decision was overturned.
Pasquier v. Tarr, 444 F.2d 116, 117 (5th Cir. 1971). In Sandier v. Tarr, 463 F.2d 1096
(4th Cir. 1972), aff'g 345 F. Supp. 612 (D. Md. 1971), the Fourth Circuit also adopted
the view that whatever effect was to be given the Gregory class judgment collapsed when
it was reversed on appeal.
64. Schrader v. Selective Serv. Sys., 328 F. Supp. 891, 891-92 (W.D. Wis. 1971),
rev'd, 470 F.2d 73 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1085 (1972); followed, Whitmore
v. Tart, 331 F. Supp. 1369 (D. Neb. 1971), on remand after an earlier decision giving
the Gregory class judgment binding effect was vacated by the Eighth Circuit and re-
manded for reconsideration in light of the reversal of Gregory by the Sixth Circuit.
Whitmore v. Tarr, 443 F.2d 1370 (8th Cir.), vacating 318 F. Supp. 1279 (D. Neb.
1970), cert denied, 403 U.S. 922 (1971).
65. Schrader v. Selective Serv. Sys., 328 F. Supp. 891, 892-93 (W.D. Wis. 1971),
rev'd, 470 F.2d 73 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1085 (1972).
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which held that "the absolute failure to give any indicia of notice to
absent members renders the purported class action in Gregory futile.",6
The court stated that the Second Circuit's decision in Eisen II was the
only appellate ruling on the requirement of notice when proceeding un-
der subsections (b)(1) and (b)(2) of Rule 23, and that the Second
Circuit's interpretation was correct.r The court also cited the district
court decision in Pasquier,68 which had denied injunctive relief to pros-
pective draftees on the basis that it would be unfair to hold the govern-
ment bound by the Gregory class judgment when absent class members
would not have been similarly bound had the case been decided the
other way. 69
In Zeilstra v. Tarr7" the Sixth Circuit adopted the view expressed
by the Seventh Circuit in Schrader, and held "that Gregory was not a
valid class action since no notice was ever given to the members of the
class.'
The Zeilstra and Schrader decisions thus extended the erosion
of Rule 23 that was begun by the Second Circuit in Eisen H. The
Second Circuit, in holding that notice is required in all actions brought
under Rule 23, had overturned subsection (c)(2) of the Rule, which
states that notice is mandatory only in actions brought pursuant to sub-
section (b)(3). The Sixth and Seventh Circuits, in holding that a
judgment rendered without notice is void with respect to the claims of
absent class members, overturned subsection (c)(3) of the Rule,
which indicates that judgments in (b) (1) and (b) (2) actions are to
be binding upon all members of the class, whether they were given
notice of the proceeding or not.
Class Remedies Denied
Nullification of subsections (c) (2) and (c) (3) of Rule 23 on
the ground that these subsections fail to comport with the constitutional
demands of due process raises important questions regarding the future
use of class actions as a means of correcting pervasive societal violations
of civil and constitutional rights. Must a court, before it may enjoin
intentional countywide racial segregation in public schools, order that
notice be provided at the expense of the class representatives to all
66. Schrader v. Selective Serv. Sys., 470 F.2d 73, 75 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1085 (1972).
67. Id.
68. 318 F. Supp. 1350 (E.D. La. 1970).
69. See text accompanying notes 49-53 supra.
70. 466 F.2d 111 (6th Cir. 1972).
71. Id. at 113.
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black school-age children living within the county?72 And, if no notice
is given and a judgment is rendered requiring the school authorities to
correct racial imbalances, is that judgment enforceable only by the
named class representatives, and invalid as to all other black children
adversely affected by the illegal discriminatory practices which were the
subject of the action?
According to the Advisory Committee, among the suits subsection
(b)(2) of Rule 23 was intended to reach were "actions in the civil-
rights field where a party is charged with discriminating unlawfully
against a class, usually one whose members are incapable of specific
enumeration." 73  But where the members of a class are incapable of
specific enumeration, it follows that they cannot be identified and pro-
vided with individual notice of an action filed on their behalf. If indi-
vidual notice is required by due process, then due process cannot be
satisfied. From this reasoning some courts have held that civil-rights
actions cannot be maintained under Rule 23 when the membership of
the affected class is such that individual notice cannot be provided,7 4
notwithstanding the fact that this conclusion is directly contrary to one
of the clearly articulated purposes of the Rule.
Limiting the membership of the class to persons who can be
identified and provided with individual notice of the action produces
the corollary result of limiting the relief that can be granted. In many
instances courts will be powerless to prevent future illegal conduct.
Examples are cases alleging illegal discriminatory practices in employ-
ment. These actions often include within the affected class all black
persons who have been dissuaded in the past from applying for a job
with a particular employer by that employer's reputation for discrimina-
tory hiring policies, 75 or all black persons who may apply for employ-
ment in the future with a particular employer.7 6 These persons would
be injured by future discriminatory practices in hiring on the part of
the employer, and they must be parties to the suit in order to claim
the benefits of a judgment restraining the employer from continuing
to engage in such conduct. But these persons are necessarily unknown
at the time of the suit, and consequently cannot be provided with indi-
vidual notice that a suit has been filed on their behalf. If the members
72. See Vaughns v. Board of Educ., 355 F. Supp. 1034, 1035 n.1 (D. Md. 1972)
(holding notice not required in such an action).
73. Advisory Comm. Note, supra note 3, at 102.
74. Allen v. Pipefitters Local 208, 56 F.R.D. 473 (D. Colo. 1972); Deyle v. Da-
vis, 16 F.R. Serv. 2d 862 (D. Vt. 1972); Inmates of Milwaukee County Jail v. Peterson,
51 F.R.D. 540 (E.D. Wis. 1971); contra, Poe v. Menghini, 339 F. Supp. 986 (D. Kan.
1972); Johnson v. City of Baton Rouge, 50 F.R.D. 295 (E.D. La. 1970).
75. E.g., Arnold v. Ballard, 6 E.P.D. 8838 (N.D. Ohio 1973).
76. E.g., Pennsylvania v. Glickman, 7 E.P.D. 9125 (W.D. Pa. 1974).
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of a class must receive notice of a suit brought on their behalf in order
to claim the benefits of a judgment rendered against the opposing party,
it follows that future applicants and employees will be unable to force
an employer to implement and maintain court-ordered affirmative
action programs in recruiting and hiring.
Doubts are also raised as to the future of class actions by aggrieved
consumers and other groups of persons who individually suffer only
minimal monetary damages, but who collectively can assert very sub-
stantial losses due to widespread illegal practices by the defendant.
The Supreme Court's holding in Eisen that individual notice must be
provided to the absent class members at the expense of the named
representatives in actions brought under subsection (b)(3) of Rule
23 was based only upon statutory interpretation,77 so that the way is
left open for legislative change. A reaffirmation of that holding on
constitutional grounds might forever preclude effective private con-
sumer remedies for mass wrongs. In Eisen, for example, the cost of
mailing individual notice to the two million identifiable class members
was estimated to exceed $200,000.7 8 Few litigants would be willing
to advance such a large amount in order to vindicate a claim insignifi-
cant by comparison.
A Critical Re-evaluation
The increasingly strict notice requirements being imposed by the
courts in Rule 23 class actions have been said to "frustrate the purpose
of the statute,"79 to be "not sound"80 and "too inflexible,"81 and to
result in "a denial of judicial relief which cannot be justified." '  The
remainder of this note examines the reasons why difficulties have arisen
in accomodating class actions to constitutional due process require-
ments, and suggests revisions to the Rule which would permit these dif-
ficulties to be overcome through application of the principles of res
judicata and collateral estoppel.
Purpose and Historical Development of Rule 23
The concept of the class action developed in equity as an excep-
tion to the general rule of compulsory joinder that all the interested
parties to a dispute must be before the court in order for a suit to be
77. See notes 38-40 and accompanying text supra.
78. 52 F.R.D. at 263.
79. McCall, supra note 14, at 1394.
80. 3B MooRE's, supra note 1, 23.55, at 23-1152.
81. Id.
82. Note, Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin-Fluid Recovery, Minihearings and Notice
In Class Actions, 54 B.U.L. Ruv. 111, 154 (1974).
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maintained."3 Where there was a common interest or a common right
which the suit sought to establish or enforce, a representative action
could be brought when:
the parties interested in the suit are numerous, their rights and lia-
bilities are so subject to change and fluctuation by death or other-
wise, that it would not be possible, without very great inconven-
ience, to make all of them parties, and would oftentimes prevent
the prosecution of the suit to a hearing.8 4
The decree of the court of equity in such an action bound all of the
absent parties in the same manner as if they had been brought before
the court.8 5
A typical class suit in equity was an action against an insurance
company by a few policy holders on behalf of all others contending that
assessments being levied by the company were excessive,8 6 or an action
against a fraternal association by a few of its members contending that
an increase in dues was beyond the authority of the association's gov-
erning body.87  It is said that the judgments in such actions were bind-
ing on the absent class members because of the employment of a legal
fiction that absent members had consented to have the class representa-
tives act as their agents in bringing the suit:
These cases suggest that when an individual voluntarily enters into
a relationship in which others will enjoy the same rights stemming
from a common source, he impliedly "consents" that questions of
law and fact, arising out of the common subject of the relationship,
will be litigated without his actual knowledge but with assurances
that his "common" interests will be adequately represented.88
This concept was established in the federal courts in 1912 when
Federal Equity Rule 38 was adopted. That rule provided that absent
class members would be bound by the judgment rendered by a federal
court of equity in cases involving a question of common or general in-
83. See Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. 288, 302-03 (1853).
84. Id. at 303.
85. Id.
86. See, e.g., Hartford Life Ins. Co. v. Ibs, 237 U.S. 662 (1915).
87. See, e.g., Supreme Council of the Royal Arcanum v. Green, 237 U.S. 531
(1915).
88. Maraist & Sharp, Federal Procedure's Troubled Marriage: Due Process and the
Class Action, 49 TEXAs L. Rav. 1, 4 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Maraist & Sharp].
See McLaughlin, The Mystery of the Representative Suit, 26 Gno. L.J. 878 (1938)
[hereinafter cited as McLaughlin]. "Equity takes jurisdiction to avoid multiplicity, and
all persons affected become necessary parties. The same situation which affords the ba-
sis of jurisdiction renders it impracticable to bring them all into court. The court is
in a dilemma. It cannot proceed without the presence of necessary parties and they are
too numerous to bring in. The Gordian knot is cut by a conclusive presumption on the
court's part that the absent class members have delegated the actual plaintiff to 'repre-
sent' them in court. This, of course, is errant fiction." Id. at 890-91 (footnotes
omitted).
Spring 19751 RULE 23
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
terest 8s The former rule governing class suits had stated that the judg-
ment in a representative action brought in the federal courts would be
without prejudice to the rights and claims of absent parties. 0
In 1937 original Rule 23 was adopted. It expanded the equitable
concept of class actions to include not only cases of compulsory joinder,
but also cases of permissive joinder.' Three categories of class suits
were set forth, "true," "hybrid," and "spurious."92
"True" and "hybrid" class suits under original Rule 23 were
merely continuations of the traditional equity concept of a class action.
The "true" class suit involved a class in which the right sought to be
enforced by or against the class was "joint, or common, or secondary
in the sense that the owner of a primary right refuses to enforce that
right and a member of the class thereby becomes entitled to enforce
it." 3  The right sued upon was of a nondivisable nature,94 as in an ac-
tion brought by or against representatives of an unincorporated associa-
tion, or to enforce rights held in common by the policyholders against
a corporate issuer of insurance policies.9 5 The "hybrid" class suit
involved a class in which the rights sought to be enforced by or against
the class were several, and the object of the action was the adjudication
of claims affecting specific property,96 as in an action by a creditor for
liquidation or reorganization of a corporation.17  The "true" and "hy-
brid" class suits were thus actions requiring compulsory joinder, involv-
ing a voluntary relationship with shared rights springing from a common
source. A legal fiction that an agency relationship existed between the
class representatives and the absent class members could therefore be
employed, and judgments in these actions were to be binding upon the
absent class members.98
89. See Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 363-67 (1921); see
generally Lesar, Class Suits and the Federal Rules, 22 MINN. L. REv. 34, 34-39 (1937).
90. Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 364 (1921).
91. Moore & Cohn, Federal Class Actions, 32 ILL. L. RPv. 307, 308-09 (1937)
[hereinafter cited as Moore & Cohn]. Professor Moore was research assistant to the
reporter for the Advisory Committee on Rules for Civil Procedure at the time original
Rule 23 was drafted.
92. Id. at 314-21.
93. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1), 308 U.S. 689 (1937), as amended, 383 U.S. 1047
(1966).
94. See 3B MooRE's, supra note 1, 23.30, at 23-502.
95. See Advisory Committee's Note, Original Rule 23, 28 U.S.C. 7763 (1970).
96. 3B Moom's, supra note 1, I 23.30, at 23-502.
97. See Advisory Committee's Note, Original Rule 23, 28 U.S.C. 7763 (1970).
98. See McLaughlin, supra note 88, at 893 n.124; 3B MooRE's, supra note 1,
1 23.30, at 23-501-23-502. But see Note, Class Actions and Interpleader: California
Procedure and the Federal Rules, 6 STAN. L. RaV. 120, 137-41 (1953) [hereinafter cited
4s Class Aetion$ qnd Interpleader].
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The "spurious" class suit was an innovation for the federal courts, 9
and was a permissive joinder device to be employed when there were
numerous persons with severable rights, but with interests in a common
question of law or fact.' Precedent for this kind of class suit was
found in a number of state court decisions,' 0 ' and perhaps in the equita-
ble bill of peace where, to avoid a multiplicity of suits, the chancellor,
could require parallel suits involving common questions of law or fact
to be tried together.10 2
A "spurious" class suit could be brought by the class representa-
tives on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated. 10 3 Class
members were free to join the action or not,10 4 and did not have to
show an independent basis of federal jurisdiction in order to inter-
vene. °5 The judgment was to be binding only as to those class mem-
bers who actually came before the court;' class members who did not
join the action were not bound by its outcome, whether favorable or
unfavorable to the class.10 7
Since the rights of the class members in a "spurious" class suit
99. It was sometimes argued that a "spurious" class suit could be brought under
Federal Equity Rule 38, which was in force prior to the adoption of original Rule 23.
Suits on behalf of a group of taxpayers to enjoin the collection of an illegal tax were
permitted under Equity Rule 38, and these suits were said to establish the proposition
that a common interest in a controlling question of law was all that was necessary to
maintain an action as a class action under that Rule. Casenote, Federal Practice-Class
Suits-Community of Interest Under Federal Equity Rule 38, 30 MIcH. L. REv. 624,
625 (1932). Except for the fact that a taxpayer's relationship with the government
may not be a voluntary one, there is little difference between a suit to enjoin a tax, and
suits to enjoin assessments by an insurance company or suits to enjoin dues increases
by a fraternal association. The fact that a judgment in an individual action holding a
tax statute valid or invalid would operate upon all taxpayers similarly situated makes
those persons "indispensable parties" to the suit in the sense that their rights and liabili-
ties will necessarily be determined by its outcome, and thus distinguishes that kind of
suit from the "spurious" class suit, which, was characterized by permissive rather than
compulsory joinder.
100. See Moore & Cohn, supra note 91, at 318.
101. Seeid. at319.
102. See Z. CHAPEE, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 200-13 (1950) [hereinafter cited
as CHAEE]; Marcin, Searching for the Origin of the Class Action, 23 CATH. U.L. REV.
515, 518-19 (1974); see generally Chafee, Bills of Peace with Multiple Parties, 45 HAv.
L. REv. 1297 (1932).
103. Moore & Cohn, supra note 91, at 318.
104. 3B MooRE's, supra note 1, 23.30, at 23-502.
105. Advisory Comm. Note, supra note 3, at 99.
106. Moore & Cohn, Federal Class Actions-Jurisdiction and Effect of Judgment,
32 ILL. L. REv. 555, 561 (1938) [hereinafter cited as Moore & Cohn, Jurisdiction].
107. 3B MooRE's, supra note 1, f 23.30, at 23-502. It has been argued, however,
that the Advisory Committee actually intended that "spurious" class judgments, as well
as "true" and "hybrid" class judgments, were to be binding upon absent class members.
See Class Actions and Interpleader, supra note 98, at 139-40.
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were separate and independent, any class member could choose to sue
individually on his claim. Joinder was permissive, not compulsory, and
it was believed that the spurious class suit should not be allowed to
prejudice the rights of the very persons it was invented to aid by pre-
cluding them from suing in their own right if they desired to do so.'0 s
Furthermore, to bind absent class members by the judgment might vio-
late their rights of due process:
It can be said that it is hard on the defendants to be made
to defend another action which has for its object the same purpose,
but that is not so harsh as it would be to deprive the plaintiff of
its day in court. 10 9
In 1966 revised Rule 23 was adopted. According to the Advisory
Committee the original Rule had proven to be deficient in three ways.
First, the courts had difficulty in deciding whether a suit was to be de-
fined as "true," "hybrid," or "spurious" because of confusion over the
concepts of "joint," "common," and "several" rights which were the
basis for those classifications."10 Second, the Rule did not provide an
adequate guide to the proper extent of judgments, and the courts were
prone to indicate that a judgment would bind the class in cases where
it should not, and to indicate that a judgment would not bind the class
in cases where it should."' And third, the Rule did not provide
adequate guidance to the courts in assuring procedural fairness.,12
The revised Rule was also said to exclude "one-way intervention," a
much-criticised practice whereby some courts had allowed class mem-
bers in "spurious" class suits to intervene after a decision on the merits
favorable to their interests and thereupon obtain the benefits of the
decision, even though they could have elected not to intervene if the
decision was unfavorable, and so not be affected by it.",
The Advisory Committee portrayed the revision of Rule 23 as
merely minor adjustments necessary to make the Rule operate as
originally intended. 1 4  The problem, it seemed to say, was that the
courts didn't know how to properly interpret the language of the
original Rule, so that it was not working satisfactorily in practice. The
108. See Moore & Cohn, Jurisdiction, supra note 106, at 561.
109. Id., quoting First Nat'l Bank v. Edwards, 134 S.C. 348, 352, 132 S.E. 824, 825
(1926).
110. See Advisory Comm. Note, supra note 3, at 98.
111. See id. at 98-99.
112. See id. at 99.
113. Id. at 105-06.
114. See Note, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Rule 23, The Class Action De-
vice and its Utilization, 22 U. FLA. L. RaV. 631 (1970). "New rule 23 does not alter
the underlying purpose of the former rule, but rather expands and clarifies it, and pro-
vides means better suited to accomplish its original purposes." Id. at 633.
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new Rule would solve this problem by using clearer language and by
spelling out exactly who was to be bound by the class judgment:
The amended rule describes in more practical terms the occasions
for maintaining class actions; provides that all class actions main-
tained to the end as such will result in judgments including those
whom the court finds to be members of the class, whether or not
the judgment is favorable to the class; and refers to the measures
which can be taken to assure the fair conduct of these actions. 115
In fact revised Rule 23 was not merely a tuned-up version of its
predecessor. Instead it was the embodiment of fundamental changes
in the nature and purpose of the federal class action device. The 1966
amendments were intended to meet two increasingly insistent criticisms
of the original Rule. First, the original Rule failed to provide a satis-
factory vehicle for remedying wrongs done to large numbers of persons
having no community of interest other than as victims of a common in-
jury. Second, the Rule spawned constant questions as to the binding
effect of class judgments with respect to absent members, and threat-
ened the courts and the party opposing the class with the possibility
of repetitious litigation over matters already once decided.
The notion that the federal class action should serve as a vehicle
to remedy mass wrongs was apparently first set forth in a watershed
law review article 1 " written in 1941 by two members of the Illinois
Bar, Harry Kalven, Jr. and Maurice Rosenfield. They argued that
there was a vital and urgent need to transform the federal class action
so as to provide a group remedy for individual injuries of a common
nature that would otherwise go uncorrected:
Modern society seems increasingly to expose men to such
group injuries for which individually they are in a poor position to
seek legal redress, either because they do not know enough or be-
cause such redress is disproportionately expensive. If each is left
to assert his rights alone if and when he can, there will at best be
a random and fragmentary enforcement, if there is any at all. This
result is not only unfortunate in the particular case, but it will oper-
ate seriously to impair the deterrent effect of the sanctions which
underlie much contemporary law. The problem of fashioning an
effective and inclusive group remedy is thus a major one.117
Since the injured individuals making up such a class had indepen-
dent rights against the offending party, joinder was not compulsory and
the cause could not be brought as a "true" or "hybrid" class suit under
original Rule 23. The "spurious" class suit, where joinder was permis-
sive, was a possibly remedy, but an extremely unlikely one:
115. Advisory Comm. Note, supra note 3, at 99.
116. Kalven & Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. Cm.
L. REv. 684 (1941) [hereinafter cited as Kalven & Rosenfield]. See CHAPEE, supra note
102, at 199-200.
117. Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 116, at 686.
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The cardinal difficulty with joinder, however, is that it presupposes
the prospective plaintiffs' advancing en masse on the courts. In
most situations such spontaneity cannot arise because the various
parties who have the common interest are isolated, scattered, and
utter strangers to each other. Thus while the necessity for group
action through joinder clearly exists, the conditions for it do not.
It may not be enough for society simply to set up courts and wait
for litigants to bring their complaints-they may never come. 118
The solution proposed by Kalven and Rosenfield was to do away
with the concept of permissive joinder in class actions involving only
common questions of law or fact, and instead allow one or a few class
members to assert the claims of all." 9 After judgment the absent class
members would be notified that they could participate in the benefits
of the decree."' Through this scheme the individual who had suffered
an injury involving only minor monetary damages would be able to ob-
tain competent legal representation and bring a suit for redress even
if the action should be a complex one, for the attorney, if successful
in prosecuting the suit, would be entitled to a fee based on the claims
of the entire class."2'
Other commentators with different interests argued that original
Rule 23 should be changed so as to meet the "public interest in avoid-
ing unnecessary litigation and in bringing to an end in an efficient and
economical fashion such litigation as there must be.' "',2 The concept
of the "spurious" class suit, in which absent class members were not
bound by the judgment, was particularly offensive, for an absent class
member:
may sit back and decline to participate in the class suit when it
is brought and then later, after it has been carried through to judg-
ment, sue in his own behalf with the benefit of full disclosure of
his adversary's case. 123
If principles of natural justice and fair play are to be considered, it was
said, it is not fair or just to the party opposing the class to be called
upon to fight a number of suits all turning upon the same issue.124
And finally, it is much fairer to society as a whole-the group that pays
118. Id. at 687-88.
119. See id. at 688, 691. Kalven and Rosenfield did not, however, believe that ab-
sent class members should be bound by an adverse judgment. They argued that the op-
posing party should be bound, because he has been afforded his day in court. The ab-
sent class members, on the other hand, have not had the opportunity to present their
own cases in their own right, and should therefore not be bound. Sec id. at 712-14.
120. See id. at 691.
121. See id. at 715-17.
122. Keeffe, Levy & Donovan, Lee Defeats Ben Hur, 33 CORNELL L.Q. 327, 334
(1948).
123. Id. at 343.
124. Id.
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the bills for long-drawn-out and costly litigation-to settle as much as
possible in a single suit.12 5
The difficulties the courts had in applying original Rule 23 were
more likely to have resulted from attempts by the courts to meet these
criticisms than from a lack of clarity in the language of the Rule. "One-
way intervention," for example, provided an incentive to the attorney
to bring a suit on behalf of a class of persons whose individual injuries
were so slight that separate suits would be impractical. Attorneys'
fees in class actions brought under original Rule 23 were usually based
upon the amount of the common fund or property captured by the judg-
ment.' -" Allowing absent class members to intervene to secure the
benefits of the judgment thus ensured that an attorney could be found
to take the case. If he prevailed and a large number of class mem-
bers then chose to intervene and take the benefit of the judgment, the
recovery would be great enough to provide adequate compensation for
his efforts. Furthermore, "one-way intervention" resulted in the more
expeditious and efficient disposition of litigation by eliminating the
necessity for subsequent suits by the absent class members.2 7
The problems experienced by the courts in placing a class suit
within the proper category of original Rule 23 were often clearly the
result of attempts to meet new judicial needs rather than from confusion
over the nature of the rights involved in the action. Some courts freely
conceded that they classified suits as "true" rather than "spurious" even
when the rights asserted were admittedly "several," in order that a
favorable class judgment would be extended to absent class members
who individually would not be able to afford the costs of obtaining legal
redress.' 2s Extension of the judgment to absent class members by this
means also obviously served to prevent repetitious litigation.
125. Id. It was also contended that a single suit whose judgment binds the entire
class would afford a stronger protection against fraudulent suits, bad faith settlements,
and phony dismissals, because each member of the class would be on his guard lest he
find himself bound by such tricks through his failure to make a timely objection. Id.
This argument is wholly unpersuasive, for there is no reason to engage in such tactics
in the first place if the judgment obtained thereby will have no binding effect upon the
absent members.
126. Simeone, Procedural Problems of Class Suits, 60 MICH. L. Rnv. 905, 950
(1962).
127. See Union Carbide and Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561 (10th Cir.
1961). "Defendants' liability and the extent thereof has been completely proven by the
named plaintiffs and it would be grossly redundant to say that it must be proven again
by the unnamed members of the represented class." Id. at 589.
128. See, e.g., System Fed'n No. 91 v. Reed, 180 F.2d 991 (6th Cir. 1950). In
Weeks v. Bareco Oil Co., 125 F.2d 84, 89-90 (7th Cir. 1941), the court noted that the
relative financial ability of the "individual small jobbers" and the "able, financially pow-
erful companies" was such that "[tio permit the defendants to contest liability with each
claimant in a single, separate suit, would, in many cases give defendants an advantage
which would be almost equivalent to closing the door of justice to all small claimants."
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An examination of revised Rule 23 reveals that it too was an at-
tempt to meet growing demands for a new group remedy which would
provide redress for individual injuries of a common nature and avoid
repetitious litigation of questions already once decided, rather than
merely an instrument which would provide superior means for accom-
plishing the same purposes as its predecessor. Compulsory joinder was
scrapped as a condition for maintaining a class action in the federal
courts. Suits brought under the revised Rule were maintained on be-
half of all the members of the described class, 29 and except for mem-
bers of a (b) (3) class who requested exclusion the judgment was to
embrace the entire class. The purpose of Rule 23 was no longer
merely to permit an adjudication of rights in situations where such an
adjudication would not otherwise be possible because jurisdiction could
not to be obtained over all parties indispensable to the suit. Instead
under the revised Rule:
the class suit both eliminates the possibility of repetitious litigation
and provides small claimants with a method of obtaining redress for
claims which would otherwise be too small to warrant individual
litigation. 130
Notice, Due Process and Res Judicata
When compulsory joinder was eliminated as a requisite for main-
taining a class action under Rule 23, the rationale previously used to
hold a class judgment binding upon absent members could no longer
be applied. Under original Rule 23 the absent members were said to
have given an implied consent to suits on their behalf when they volun-
tarily entered into legal relationships which gave them common
interests with a class.' 3 ' But under the revised Rule the class
representatives were free to bring suit on behalf of persons who
have never done anything which could possibly be construed as confer-
ring a power of agency upon complete strangers to act on their be-
half. 32
129. "One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties
on behalf of all.. . .. FE. R. Crv. P. 23(a).
130. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 560 (2d Cir. 1968). See Kaplan,
A Prefatory Note, 10 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. Rav. 497 (1969); Kaplan, supra note 6, at
397-98; Comment, Adequate Representation, Notice and the New Class Action Rule:
Effectuating Remedies Provided by the Securities Laws, 116 U. PA. L. Rnv. 889, 892-
93 (1968).
131. See note 88 and accompanying text supra.
132. Professor Moore apparently contends that even under revised Rule 23 a legal
relationship exists between class members in suits brought under subsections (b) (1) and
(b) (2) which permits the courts to adopt the legal fiction that absent class members
have delegated the representative party to protect their interests. "[A] judgment should
be res judicata as to all the class, even in the absence of notice, in the (b) (1) and (b)
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The Advisory Committee provided little guidance as to the basis
upon which absent class members might now be bound by the class
judgment. In actions maintained under subsection (b)(3), the Com-
mittee stated that the mandatory notice in such actions was designed
to fulfill requirements of due process.' 33 Nothing, however, was said
about actions maintained under subsection (b) (1) and (b) (2), other
than a cryptic statement that the court has discretion under sub-
section (d)(2) of the Rule to require notice, and sometimes may find
it advisable to do so. 134  Yet subsection (b)(2) was specifically in-
tended to reach class actions seeking to enjoin racial discrimination and
other violations of civil and constitutional rights,'35 actions within the
"spurious" category of the original Rule'3 6 so that absent members were
not bound by the class judgment:
That a class suit injunction, if issued, against racial discrimina-
tion and the violation of other civil rights would have a beneficial
effect upon all loss [sic] members-including non-interveners-
should not alter the general doctrine that a judgment in a spurious
class action adverse to the class did not bind those who were not
parties to the class suit.' 37
An examination of the possible grounds for giving binding effect to
class action judgments will therefore be undertaken.
In order for a person's rights to be concluded by a judgment, the
judgment must operate either as res judicata or as collateral estoppel
with respect to his claims or defenses. If the person was a party or
in privity with a party to the prior suit, the question is one of res judi-
cata. 35 If the person was not a party or in privity with a party to the
(2) situations when the requirements of Rule 23 have been satisfied. On the other
hand, in the (b) (3) type of class suit, where notice is mandatory, there is no jural rela-
tionship between the members. They are merely fellow travelers related only by some
common question of law or fact and with a right to opt out of the class." 3B MooRE's,
supra note 1, 23.55, at 23-1153. Professor Miller also argues that judgments should
bind absent class members in (b) (1) and (b) (2) suits because the absent members have
an "ongoing association" with the class representatives. Miller, Problems of Giving No-
tice in Class Actions, 58 F.R.D. 313, 315 (1973).
This contention is obviously an anachronism, has no reasonable basis in fact, and
should not be accepted. The Supreme Court has warned that where a judgment purports
to bind a person who did not receive effective notice of the proceeding, due process re-
quires that "great caution should be used not to let fiction deny the fair play that can
be secured only by a pretty close adhesion to fact." McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90,
91 (1916).
133. See note 6 and accompanying text supra.
134. See note 9 and accompanying text supra.
135. See note 73 and accompanying text supra.
136. 3B MoOR's, supra note 1, 23.10[3], at 23-2651-23-2653.
137. Id., 23.10-1, at 23-2769. But see Comment, The Class Action Device in
Antisegregation Cases, 20 U. Cm. L. Rnv. 577, 589-92 (1953).
138. See Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 597 (1948); Cromwell v. County
of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 352 (1876).
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prior suit, or where a stranger seeks to assert the judgment from a prior
suit against one of the parties thereto, the question is one of collateral
estoppel. 13
9
The class action as conceived in equity and under original Rule
23 was a suit in which all the members of the class were actually parties
before the court, either personally or through agents having the consent
of absent members to represent their interests. 140 The class judgment
was said to operate as res judicata with respect to their claims and de-
fenses. 1 4 1
In Hansberry v. Lee14 2 the Supreme Court recognized the princi-
ple that a judgment in a representative action could operate as res judi-
cata with respect to the claims of persons not actually present, but the
Court created an exception to that rule. The Court held that the doc-
trine could not be applied where the interests of the representative
parties were in conflict with the interests of absent class members, for
in such a situation the interests of the absent members were not
adequately protected in the prior suit.
43
Hansberry was decided before revised Rule 23 was adopted.
Under the revised Rule the basis for presuming that absent class mem-
bers have given an implied consent to have their interests championed
by the representative party has been eliminated. It follows that the
doctrine of res judicata can no longer operate with respect to the claims
and defenses of absent class members merely by virtue of the fact that
the suit is properly brought as a representative action. In order for
the doctrine of res judicata to be applied under revised Rule 23, a new
reason must be found for holding that absent class members are to be
considered as parties to the suit. One possibility exists. Absent class
members who receive notice of the action, informing them that they
have the right to be excluded from the judgment or to enter an appear-
ance through their own counsel, may be said to have been joined in
the suit through receipt of that notice.
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.", is the leading
case with respect to the extent of notice that is required in order for
139. See Note, Developments in the Law-Res Judicata, 65 HARV. L. REv. 818,
861-62 (1952).
140. See text accompanying notes 83-98 supra.
141. See RESTATEMENT OF JuDGMENTS § 86 (1942).
142. 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
143. Id. at 44-45.
144. 339 U.S. 306 (1950). Because Mullane was not a class action, the Court had
no basis for adopting the legal fiction that absent persons whose interests were being
adjudicated had delegated the party actually bringing the suit to act as their representa-
tive. The Court was thus confronted with the issue of whether persons not actually
present were "parties" to a lawsuit so as to be bound by the judgment through the prin-
ciples of res judicata.
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a judgment to operate as res judicata with respect to the interests of
persons not actually before the court. The Supreme Court held in
Mullane that a statute providing for published notice to the benefici-
aries of a trust, prior to judicial proceedings which would be binding
and conclusive as to the propriety of the management of the common
trust fund and the amount in each beneficiary's individual account,
failed to satisfy due process because it was not "reasonably calculated
to reach those who could easily be informed by other means at
hand.' 45 The Court spelled out the extent of notice that would be
required by due process in various circumstances before the interests
of an absent person could be concluded by the doctrine of res judicata.
Fundamental to due process, the Court said, is the opportunity to be
heard before being deprived of life, liberty or property:
This right to be heard has little reality or worth unless one is in-
formed that the matter is pending and can choose for himself
whether to appear or default, acquiesce or contest.146
Personal service within the jurisdiction is not always necessary, the
Court said, for the interests or claims of individuals must be balanced
against the interests of the state in settling issues of possible dispute.'47
Notice by mail may be adequate with respect to trust beneficiaries
whose interests and addresses were known to the trustee, 4 " but notice
by publication was deemed sufficient only with respect to those bene-
ficiaries whose interests or whereabouts could not with due diligence
be ascertained. 49 Since notice by mail would be reasonably certain
to reach most of those having interests in the trust, the rights of bene-
ficiaries who were not informed of the proceeding could properly be
concluded by it, for the interests of these beneficiaries would be
identical with the interests of a class which was informed of te pro-
ceeding and provided an opportunity to be heard, and therefore those
interests received adequate protection. 50
In class actions brought pursuant to subsection (b) (3) of revised
Rule 23, individual notice must be directed to all class members who
can be identified through reasonable effort,' 5' so most of the members
of the class would be informed that a proceeding was pending in which
their interests were at stake, and would be free to choose whether to
appear, acquiesce to the representation, or request exclusion from the
judgment. This is sufficient under the rule of Mullane to hold that all
145. Id. at 319.
146. Id. at 314.
147. Id. at 313-14.
148. Id. at 318.
149. Id. at 317.
150. Id. at 319.
151. See note 6 and accompanying text supra.
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absent class members who do not request exclusion are parties to the
suit, and that their interests will be concluded by the judgment through
operation of the doctrine of res judicata. 52
In class actions brought pursuant to subsections (b)(1) and (b)
(2) of revised Rule 23, however, notice to absent class members is not
required.153  If the absent class members of (b)(1) and (b)(2) ac-
tions are to be bound by the judgment it cannot therefore be through
operation of the judgment as res judicata with respect to their claims
and defenses. The absent class members of (b) (1) and (b) (2) ac-
tions can only be bound through operation of the judgment as collateral
estoppel.1 4
152. The extent to which unnamed class members not actually before the court can
be considered as "parties" to the suit for other purposes than as persons who will be
bound by the judgment is one that is currently perplexing the courts. It has been held
that unnamed class members can be required to submit to discovery under Federal Rules
33 and 34, discovery devices which are restricted to parties to the action, on pain of
dismissal of their claims with prejudice for failure to respond; Brennan v. Midwestern
United Life Ins. Co., 450 F.2d 999 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 921 (1972);
see Comment, Party Discovery Techniques: A Threat to Underlying Federal Policies,
68 Nw. U.L. REv. 1063 (1974); Note, Requests for Information in Class Actions, 83
YALE LJ. 602 (1974); ef. Note, Deposing Unnamed Plaintiffs in Class Actions: South-
ern California Edison Co. v. Superior Court, 6 LOYoLA L. Ruv. (Los ANGELES) 556
(1973); but that the unnamed class members are not parties against whom counter-
claims may be asserted under Federal Rule 13. Donson Stores v. American Bakeries
Co., 58 F.R.D. 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), noted in 87 HARV. L. REv. 470 (1973).
A related problem is whether class members who receive no notice of the proceed-
ing but who do receive notice of an opportunity to contest a proposed settlement may
be considered as parties to the settlement so as to be barred from seeking further relief
in a new suit. See Mungin v. Florida E. Coast Ry. Co., 318 F. Supp. 720 (M.D. Fla.
1970), aff'd per curiam, 441 F.2d 728 (5th Cir. 1971). But see Williamson v. Bethle-
hem Steel Corp., 468 F.2d 1201 (2d Cir. 1972).
The Supreme Court has held that in an action brought under Rule 23, absent class
members stand as parties to the suit for purposes of tolling a statute of limitations "un-
til and unless they received notice thereof and chose not to continue." American Pipe
& Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 551 (1974).
153. See notes 7-9 and accompanying text supra.
154. Some courts have held that notice is not required in order for a judgment to
operate as res judicata and conclude the claims and defenses of absent class members,
on the premise that adequacy of representation is the only requisite of due process for
that purpose. E.g., Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Grounds, 292 F. Supp. 619, 636 (D.
Kan. 1968), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 441 F.2d 704 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 951 (1971). The contention is that "the absence of an oppor-
tunity to participate would not be fatal as a matter of due proces in situations where
the interests of the absentees were harmonious with those of the parties to the suit,"
McCall, supra note 14, at 1393, and that "adequate representation cures inadequate no-
tice" for "the absentee, in effect, will have had a day in court." Note, Collateral At-
tack on the Binding Effect of Class Action Judgments, 87 HArv. L. RaV. 589, 605
(1974). See Note, Proposed Rule 23: Class Actions Reclassified, 51 VA. L. REV. 629,
636-40 (1965); see also Jacoby & Cherkasky, The Effects of Eisen IV and Proposed
Amendments of Federal Rule 23, 12 SAN DIEGo L. R£.v. 1, 11-20 (1974); Note, Civil
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Collateral Estoppel of Absent Class Members
The notion that a prior judgment may be invoked to preclude the
claims and defenses of persons who were complete strangers to the suit
is heretical and unhistorical, but it is not unprecedented. A recent
note 5 analyzes six cases involving collateral estoppel of nonparties,
and concludes that under appropriate circumstances due process does
permit a judgment to bind persons who have never been afforded an
opportunity to participate in the litigation. Among those appropriate
circumstances are factors which are usually attendant to class actions.
The starting point of the analysis is the proposition set forth in
Mullane that due process requires notice and an opportunity to be
heard before a person may be deprived of life, liberty or property. 5 '
This right is not absolute, however, and must be balanced against the
interests of the opposing party and the state.157  Normally, the interests
of a nonparty in not being bound by a prior judgment are more
important than the interests of the opposing party in being able to assert
the judgment against the nonparty.158 The nonparty has not had the
opportunity to choose the attorney whom he thinks will best represent
him, nor to pursue particular arguments and strategies and otherwise
shape the course of the litigation. 5 '
Procedure-Federal Rule 23(c2)--Notice in Class Actions-Mullane Reconsidered, 43
TuL. L. REv. 369 (1969).
The Supreme Court was presented with this argument in Eisen, but expressed no
opinion as to its validity. The Court said that regardless of what due process might
or might not require, the statutory language of Rule 23 (c) (2) clearly required individual
notice to all class members who can be identified through reasonable effort. 417 U.S.
at 176-77.
The argument is founded upon certain statements by the Supreme Court in Hans-
berry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940). See, e.g., McCall, supra note 14, at 1393. It has
a fatal flaw. Hansberry was decided at a time when the legal fiction that the represen-
tative party in a class suit had the implied consent of absent class members to act as
an agent on their behalf still possessed vitality. The 1966 amendments to Rule 23 elim-
inated the basis for that fiction, and the Mullane decision, which came after Hansberry,
squarely held that absent persons who have not consented to representation of their in-
terests by another must be provided with notice that their interests are at stake and be
given an opportunity to be heard before they can be bound by the judgment as parties
to the suit. 339 U.S. at 318-20. The Court's recognition and approval in Hansberry
of the principle that a class judgment may operate as res judicata with respect to the
claims and defenses of absent class members is therefore qualified today by the notice
requirements subsequently enunciated by the Court in Mullane.
155. Note, Collateral Estoppel of Nonparties, 87 HARv. L. REv. 1485 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Collateral Estoppel].
156. See id. at 1496. See note 146 and accompanying text supra. See also Com-
ment, Can Due Process Be Satisfied by Discretionary Notice in Federal Class Actions?
4 CREIGHTON L. Ruv. 268, 290-302 (1971).
157. Collateral Estoppel, supra note 155, at 1498.
158. Id. at 1496.
159. Id.
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Binding a nonparty on the basis of a judgment in an action
in which he did not participate, and of which he may not even have
been aware, also conflicts with important values basic to our judi-
cial system: the right of a litigant to present his arguments to a
tribunal before having his rights adjudicated, and the importance
of such personal participation to the fairness of the decision-making
process. The determination of a litigant's rights without his having
had any part of that process may, regardless of the result ultimately
reached, undermine the capacity of the court to command respect
for its decisions, and may also exacerbate the sense of frustration
or unfairness which a losing litigant might bear even after the fair-
est procedures. 16 0
To be weighed against the interests of the nonparty are the
opposing party's interests in "avoiding vexatious, lengthy, and costly
relitigation of the issue of his liability, as well as the judicial system's
interests in economy and avoiding inconsistent results . . . .""' This
panoply of interests, it is said, can be more important than the interests
of the nonparty in having his day in court. 62
160. Id. at 1496-97.
161. Id. at 1499. It has also been said that due process permits a class judgment
to bind absent members who have not been given notice and an opportunity to be heard
when "maintenance of the proceeding will further an indirect but important state inter-
est, and the impossibility or impracticability of giving actual notice would otherwise de-
feat the maintenance of the proceeding." Maraist & Sharp, supra note 88, at 9. The
rights of individual class members of access to the courts and to participate in the liti-
gation process through association have been advocated as examples of such indirect but
important state interests which can predominate over the due process rights to notice
of absent class members. See McCall, supra note 14, at 1378-87, 1396-97. Stated an-
other way, in order to provide due process to some members of the class (the represen-
tatives), it is necessary to deny due process to other members of the class (the absen-
tees). See id. at 1397; Schuck & Cohen, The Consumer Class Action: An Endangered
Species, 12 SAN DImo L. Rav. 39, 69-71 (1974). This, of course, was the justification
for the class suit in equity, where numerous persons had rights in a common thing or
association and it was impossible to bring them all before the court in order to adjudi-
cate their interests. But the absent members in a modem class suit are not indispensa-
ble parties whose interests must necessarily be concluded in order to determine the inter-
ests of persons actually before the court. There is thus no longer a necessary relation-
ship between the ability of individuals to bring suit on behalf of an injured class and
the binding effect the class judgment must have upon class members not actually before
the court, Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 116, at 711, and therefore no longer any rea-
son why the due process rights of the class representative must compete with the due
process rights of the absentees.
Note also the context in which the argument is raised. The right of the representa-
tive party to bring a class suit is said to predominate over the due process rights to notice
of absent class members in the typical consumer class action, where the injuries to be
redressed are monetary in nature and probably of only slight significance to the indi-
viduals who have sustained them. See McCall, supra note 14, at 1390-92. Whatever
persuasive force the argument may have in that context is surely lost when the action
instead seeks to terminate and redress violations of the civil or constitutional rights of
a class and thus involves injuries of much greater importance to the affected individuals.
162. Collateral Estoppel, supra note 155, at 1499. But see Maraist & Sharp, supra
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Two of the six cases cited in the note could possibly stand as
precedent on the issue of whether absent members to a federal class
action may be collaterally estopped by the judgment. 163  In Cauefield
v. Fidelity & Casualty Co."' the Fifth Circuit affirmed a judgment that
the tort claims of two plaintiffs brought in federal court under diversity
jurisdiction were estopped by a prior finding for the defendant in a suit
brought by a different plaintiff in a Louisiana state court. A total of
forty-one different suits had been filed in the Louisiana courts based
on the same incident, and the suit which had been filed in federal court
had been continued indefinitely until one of those suits was tried and
a judgment entered.' 65
The Fifth Circuit first noted that the behavior of the numerous
claimants suggested that the one state court case which had been
prosecuted was tacitly intended to resolve all the identical claims.166  In
addition, the issues to be tried in federal court were the same as those
already tried in state court, the plaintiffs had admitted that the evidence
and testimony they would be able to produce would not differ from that
presented in the state court, the plaintiffs and all the other possible
claimants had testified in the prior trial, and they were represented by
the same attorney who had tried the prior case. 67 The court said that
the Louisiana courts, presented with these same facts, would find that
under Louisiana law the plaintiffs were estopped by the prior judgment,
so the case had been properly dismissed. 61
In re Air Crash Disaster near Dayton, Ohio'69 involved a wrongful
death action arising out of an aircraft collision. A prior judgment had
note 88, at 22: "Judicial efficiency, translated into the simple terms of a class action
that seeks merely to combine large numbers of similar but basically separate claims,
means judicial economy; and judicial economy has never been thought to override indi-
vidual rights stemming from Anglo-American concepts of due process-the 'traditional
notions of fundamental justice and fair play' often alluded to by the Court."
163. Three of the four remaining cases cited in the note were tort claims in com-
munity property states that were brought by one spouse after the other spouse had al-
ready participated in litigation arising out of the same incident. See Collateral Estoppel,
supra note 155, at 1486-90. Operation of the prior litigation as a bar to the subsequent
claim in these cases was more likely an incident to the community property laws rather
than an application of collateral estoppel against a nonparty.
In the last case cited in the note a decision in a lower state court applying col-
lateral estoppel to nonparties was subsequently reversed on other grounds. See id. at
1494.
164. 378 F.2d 876 (5th Cir.), affg 247 F. Supp. 851 (E.D. La. 1965), cert. de-
nied, 389 U.S. 1009 (1967).
165. Id. at 877.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 877-78.
168. Id. at 879.
169. 350 F. Supp. 757 (S.D. Ohio 1972), rev'd sub nom., Humphreys v. Tann, 487
F.2d 666 (6th Cir. 1973).
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exonerated one of the defendants, and the federal district court held
that the prior judgment insulated the defendant from liability to the
present plaintiff, even though he was not a party to the action. 70 The
Sixth Circuit reversed. 17' Cauefield was distinguished on its facts.
There both sets of plaintiffs were represented by the same attorney,
and the plaintiffs in the second action had testified in the trial of the
first, to the very facts which were to be the basis for recovery in the
second trial. The jury had rejected their testimony and found for the
defendants.' 7 2  Here different attorneys and litigation strategies were
employed, and there was nothing in the proceedings to suggest that per-
sons not joined as plaintiffs in the first trial had agreed to be bound
by its outcome.'7 3 Plaintiffs in the second action here could not there-
fore be considered as parties or in privity with parties in the first action,
and the prior judgment could not properly be asserted against them. 4
This conclusion was supported by a quotation from a recent Supreme
Court decision:
Some litigants-those who never appeared in a prior action-may
not be collaterally estopped without litigating the issue. They have
never had a chance to present their evidence and arguments on the
claim. Due process prohibits estopping them despite one or more
existing adjudications of the identical issue which stand squarely
against their position.175
Of special importance here is the fact -that Hansberry v. Lee'
7 6
was cited by the Supreme Court as a decision establishing this rule,1 77
even though Hansberry involved a class action and the suit before the
Court did not. This would seem to indicate that the Court will make
no distinction between nonparties to a class action and nonparties to
an individual action for the purpose of deciding whether due process
permits a nonparty -to be collaterally estopped by a judgment.
A reasonable reading of the Cauefield and Air Crash Disaster
cases would indicate that they controvert rather than support the propo-
sition set forth in the note. The interests of judicial economy and of
avoiding repetitious litigation and inconsistent results do not permit a
judgment to operate as collateral estoppel so as to preclude the claims
and defenses of strangers to the action. The facts in Cauefield were
such that the plaintiffs in the second action could reasonably be said
to have been parties or in privity with parties to the first action, rather
170. Id. at 766-68.
171. Humphreys v. Tan, 487 F.2d 666 (6th Cir. 1973).
172. Id. at 670.
173. Id. at 671.
174. Id.
175. Blonder-Tongue v. University Foundation, 402 US. 313, 329 (1971) (dictum).
176. 311 U.S. 32 (1940). See notes 142-43 and accompanying text supra.
177. 402 U.S. at 329.
fi./
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than strangers to it, and the reversal of the Air Crash Disaster case by
the Sixth Circuit was a square holding that collateral estoppel of non-
parties violates due process. Although the authority cited by the Sixth
Circuit for its decision may have only been dictum by the Supreme
Court, it was nevertheless dictum entitled to great weight, for it was
intended to define the bounds of the Court's holding that due process
does permit a prior judgment to collaterally estop a party to the action
from asserting a claim against a nonparty.178 The unambiguous and
unqualified statement by the Supreme Court that due process does not
permit a litigant who never appeared in a prior action to be bound by
the judgment, together with the Court's citation of Hansberry v. Lee
as a case in accord, compels the conclusion that the claims and defenses
of absent class members in Rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) actions, where
no notice is given, may not be precluded by the class judgment through
operation of the judgment as collateral estoppel.
Collateral Estoppel of the Opposing Party
If a class judgment may not operate as collateral estoppel to pre-
clude the claims and defenses of absent class members in Rule 23(b)
(1) and (b)(2) actions, may it nevertheless operate to preclude the
claims and defenses of the opposing party? It will be recalled that this
question was answered in the negative by the Sixth Circuit in Zeilstra
v. Tarr 79 and the Seventh Circuit in Schrader v. Selective Service
System'80 on the basis that it would be unfair to hold the government
bound when absent class members would not be similarly bound.' 8 1 In
so holding, these courts engrafted the doctrine of mutuality of estoppel
onto Federal Rule 23. The justification for doing so is dubious at best,
for mutuality of estoppel is today generally considered "a dead
letter."182
The mutuality doctrine is that "unless both parties (or their
privies) in a second action are bound by a judgment in a previous case,
neither party (nor his privy) in the second action may use the prior
judgment as determinative of an issue in the second action.' 88  In
1912 the United States Supreme Court stated that it was "a principle
of general elementary law that the estoppel of a judgment must be
mutual."' -84 The wisdom of the doctrine was often challenged, and in
178. See notes 187-94 and accompanying text infra.
179. See note 70 supra.
180. See note 66 supra.
181. See notes 66-71 and accompanying text supra.
182. B.R. Dewitt, Inc. v. Hall, 19 N.Y.2d 141, 147, 225 N.E.2d 195, 198, 278
N.Y.S.2d 596, 601 (Ct. App. 1967).
183. Blonder-Tongue v. University Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 320-21 (1971).
184. Id. at 321, quoting Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Co., 225 U.S. 111, 127
(1912).
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1942 the California Supreme Court unanimously rejected it in Bern-
hard v. Bank of America.'8 5 Many state and federal courts followed,""
and finally, in 1971, the United States Supreme Court held in Blonder-
Tongue v. University Foundation81 that the doctrine would no longer
be blindly observed. An earlier decision was overruled and a defend-
ant in a patent infringement suit was permitted to assert as an estoppel
plea a previous judgment in favor of a different defendant that the
patent was invalid.'
A prior judgment may be invoked either offensively or defensively
by nonparties as collateral estoppel. Defensive collateral estoppel is
the assertion against a plaintiff of a prior judgment on the same issue
against the plaintiff but in favor of a different defendant. The prior
judgment operates to bar the plaintiffs claim against the second de-
fendant.'" 9 This was the form of collateral estoppel approved and
adopted by the Supreme Court in Blonder-Tongue.9
Offensive collateral estoppel is the assertion against a defendant
of a prior judgment on the same issue in favor of a different plaintiff.
The prior judgment operates to hold the defendant liable to the second
plaintiff without relitigation of the defendants wrongdoing.' 9 ' This is
the form of collateral estoppel which would operate to hold the oppos-
ing party in a class suit liable to absent class members through a favor-
able judgment obtained by the representative party.
The courts have been more hesitant to accept offensive collateral
estoppel than defensive collateral estoppel, 9 ' even though the rationale
for defensive and offensive collateral estoppel is fundamentally the
same.' 9  The Supreme Court said in Blonder-Tongue that it is no
longer tenable to afford a litigant more than one opportunity for judicial
resolution of the same issue, for this results in an unjustified misalloca-
tion of the resources of the opposing party and of the judiciary and
fosters an unacceptable lack of judicial orderliness. 94  The due process
185. 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942).
186. Blonder-Tongue v. University Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 324 (1971); see, e.g.,
cases cited at 402 U.S. 325 n.13, 402 U.S. 326 n.14.
187. 402U.S. 313 (1971).
188. Id. at 350, overruling Triplett v. Lowell, 297 U.S. 638 (1936).
189. Note, The Impacts of Defensive and Offensive Assertion of Collateral Estop-
pel by a Nonparty, 35 GEo. WASH. L. Rv. 1010, 1019 (1967) [hereinafter cited as
Defensive and Offensive Estoppel].
190. See 402 U.S. at 330, 349-50.
191. See Defensive and Offensive Estoppel, supra note 189, at 1032-33.
192. See Blonder-Tongue v. University Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 329-30 (1971);
Defensive and Offensive Estoppel, supra note 189, at 1037.
193. See B.R. Dewitt, Inc. v. Hall, 19 N.Y.2d 141, 143-47, 225 N.E.2d 195, 196-
98, 278 N.Y.S.2d 596, 597-601 (Ct. App. 1967).
194. See 402 U.S. at 328-29.
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considerations which prohibit collateral estoppel of the claims and
defenses of litigants who have never had a chance to present their evi-
dence and arguments have no application, for those who are to be
bound by the prior judgment have already been given the opportunity
for a full and fair trial.'95
Two principal arguments are made for denying offensive use of
collateral estoppel. First, it is said to hinder rather than foster judicial
orderliness. Where a number of claimants have identical claims
against a defendant, if the first or any number of plaintiffs sue and lose,
the defendant may not assert those judgments as a bar in the remain-
ing suits. But if any plaintiff should win, the defendant is then estop-
ped from denying liability to all plaintiffs whose claims were as yet
untried.'1 6 Second, it is said to be fundamentally unfair to the defend-
ant, who may not know the full extent of the potential damages that
may be levied against him. If the first claimant seeks only nominal
or small damages, the defense may be limited accordingly. Afterwards
a large group of claimants may come forward asserting much more
significant claims, all of which were totally unexpected at the time of
the original action, and the defendant will be barred from denying lia-
bility. 197
Neither of these arguments has persuasive force when applied to
class actions. Practically speaking, stare decisis provides a substantial
deterrent to repeated litigation against the same defendant by multiple
claimants. "It is unlikely that the same or a lower court will reach dif-
ferent results on the law in related cases."' 98 And, where an action
is brought as a class suit, the defendant is made fully aware of the ex-
tent of his potential liability and has adequate incentive to defend the
suit as ably as he can.
195. Id. at 329-30.
196. Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9
STAN. L. REV. 281, 285-89 (1957).
197. Defensive and Offensive Estoppel, supra note 189, at 1036.
198. Weinstein, Revision of Procedure: Some Problems in Class Actions, 9 Btr-
FALo L. Rv. 433, 446 (1960). See id. at 446-47; Schuck & Cohen, The Consumer
Class Action: An Endangered Species, 12 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 39, 70 (1974). The
widely-differing results in suits brought to enforce the class judgment of Gregory v. Her-
shey suggest, however, that the principle of stare decisis may not be given much weight
when a prior judgment rendered by a court in a different district or jurisdiction is found
to be distasteful or otherwise objectionable. Compare Schrader v. Selective Serv. Sys.,
329 F. Supp. 966 (W.D. Wis. 1971), rev'd, 470 F.2d 73 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1085 (1972); Whitmore v. Tarr, 318 F. Supp. 1279 (D. Neb. 1970), vacated, 443
F.2d 1370 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 922 (1971); Germonprez v. Director of
Selective Serv., 318 F. Supp. 829 (D.D.C. 1970), with Pasquier v. Tarr, 318 F. Supp.
1350 (E.D. La. 1970), af'd per curiam, 444 F.2d 116 (5th Cir. 1971); McCarthy v.
Director of Selective Serv. Sys., 322 F. Supp. 1032 (E.D. Wis. 1970).
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The Zeilstra and Schrader decisions were not prompted by these
considerations, however. The rationale of the Sixth and Seventh Cir-
cuits in refusing to hold the opposing party bound by the class judgment
was instead the reasoning expressed by the district court in Pasquier
v. Tarr, that to do so would "give absent members of the class two bites
at the apple at the expense of the defendant."'199 But this same argu-
ment was recently presented to the Supreme Court in a similar context,
and unceremoniously rejected. In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver
Co.200 the defendant-employer contended that an arbitral decision
adverse to an employee's claim of racial discrimination barred the
employee from filing the same claim in federal district court under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,201 for the employer would have
been bound by the arbitration award if he had lost.2 0 2  The district
court and the Tenth Circuit agreed, on the basis that a philosophy could
not be accepted "which gives the employee two strings to his bow when
the employer has only one."20 3  The Supreme Court responded that
the lower courts misunderstood the nature of the statutory rights
involved. "An employer does not have 'two strings to his bow' with
respect to an arbitral decision for the simple reason that Title VII does
not provide employers with a cause of action against employees. An
employer cannot be the victim of discriminatory employment prac-
tices. 204
The same rationale supports rejection of the mutuality doctrine in
class suits. Permitting absent class members to invoke a class judgment
against the opposing party, even though the absent class members
would not be similarly bound by a judgment adverse to their interests,
would not give the absent class members two bites at the apple at the
expense of the defendant, for the defendant had no bites at the apple
to begin with. Except for the fact that the expense of the suit would
be prohibitive in relation to the possible recovery, each member of the
class would have been free to bring his claim in a separate action in-
stead of seeking a group remedy, and the opposing party would have
been required to defend in each of these actions. The purpose of the
class suit under revised Rule 23 was not to allow a defendant to force
all persons with similar claims against him to combine their claims into
a single litigation. Instead, the federal class action was intended to pro-
199. 318 F. Supp. 1350, 1354 (E.D. La. 1970); see notes 49-53, 66-71 and accom-
panying text supra.
200. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
201. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (1970).
202. See 415 U.S. at 54.
203. Id., quoting Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 346 F. Supp. 1012, 1019 (D.
Colo. 1971).
204. Id.
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vide the small claimant with a method of redress where none was prev-
iously available and to avoid repetitious litigation of questions already
once decided. Both of these purposes would clearly be served by per-
mitting absent class members to invoke a favorable class judgment
against the opposing party as collateral estoppel.
Proposals for Change
The courts have begun to recognize the possibility that modem
principles of collateral estoppel can be used to avoid closing the court-
house door on small claimants who cannot afford the costs of sending
notice to absent class members. The leading case is the decision of
the Third Circuit in Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp.25
Paradoxically, in Katz the Third Circuit held that the suit before
it could not be brought as a class action. The plaintiff's complaint al-
leged violations of the Truth in Lending Act,206 and sought relief for
all persons who held credit cards issued by the defendant. 07  The dis-
trict court approved the suit as a class action and the defendant ap-
pealed, contending that it would be substantially prejudiced by the
mailing of notice because its credit account debtors might withhold their
payments upon learning of the basis for the suit.208 The Third Circuit
reversed, stating that the possible injury to the defendant militated
against permitting the suit to be maintained as a class action.20 9
Instead, the suit should be considered as a "test case," and the issue
of the defendant's liability should be determined solely with respect to
the class representative.210
Relying upon the Supreme Court's decision in Blonder-Tongue
v. University Foundation"' abolishing the doctrine of mutuality of es-
toppel, the court said that a judgment for the plaintiff in a test case
would be binding upon the defendant in subsequent suits brought by
the persons who would otherwise have been class members.21 Pros-
ecution of the action as a test case would therefore provide the plain-
tiff and the court with all the advantages of a class suit, but would avoid
prejudicing the interests of the defendant. The plaintiff would be able
205. 496 F.2d 747 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 95 S. Ct. 152 (1974); fol-
lowed, Boring v. Medusa Portland Cement Co., 63 F.R.D. 78 (M.D. Pa. 1974); Nash
v. Boeing Co., 63 F.R.D. 451 (E.D. Pa. 1974); noted in 88 HIv. L. Rav. 825 (1975).
206. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1681t (1970).
207. 496 F.2d at 750-51.
208. Id. at 757-58.
209. Id. at 758-62.
210. Id. See generally Advisory Comm. Note, supra note 3, at 103; Defensive and
Offensive Estoppel, supra note 189, at 1046-49.
211. See note 187 and accompanying text supra.
212. 496 F.2d at 758-59.
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to find an attorney to prosecute his claim, because the attorney's fee
would still be measured by the benefit conferred upon the entire
class.213 Relitigation of the issues is not likely to occur, for if the find-
ing is for the plaintiff the absent persons who would have been class
members can assert the judgment against the defendant as collateral
estoppel, and if the finding is for the defendant new claims against him
will be discouraged by the principle of stare decisis.2 11 Furthermore,
the plaintiff in the test case will be protected from the expense of mail-
ing notice to the class, a cost estimated to be $37,500.'"1 If the plain-
tiff prevails, then the trial court can convert the suit into a class action,
and require that notice be sent to all the class members at the expense
of the defendant, advising them that they are entitled to the benefits
of the judgment.216
In Haas v. Pittsburgh National Bank211 a federal district court in
Pennsylvania adopted the reasoning of Katz and held that summary
judgment could be granted in a class action prior to requiring that notice
be sent to absent class members when it is the defendant who has
moved for summary judgment and thereby evidenced a willingness to
rely only upon the principle of stare decisis to protect himself from sub-
sequent suits by other potential class members.21 8 This result, the
court said, would "avoid a potentially needless expenditure of court
time and plaintiff's money ... ."219
The procedures adopted in Katz and Haas indicate that the notice
requirements of revised Rule 23 can be circumvented in cases where
the party opposing the class is willing to forego notice and rely upon
the principle of stare decisis as the sole deterrent to repetitious litiga-
tion. In other cases, however, the party opposing the class may have
strong interests in obtaining a judgment which will conclude the claims
of all potential class members, regardless of whether it is favorable or
unfavorable to his interests. Furthermore, strong policy reasons con-
L. demn the procedure adopted in Katz of converting a litigation from
an individual suit to a class action after judgment. 220 Both the plaintiff
and the defendant deserve to know the extent of the defendant's po-
tential liability before litigation strategies are planned and executed.
Different problems of proof may arise when a suit seeks to show class
213. Id. at 761.
214. Id. at 760.
215. Id. at 761.
216. Id. at 760-61.
, 217. 381 F. Supp. 801 (W.D. Pa. 1974).
218. Id. at 805-06.
219. Id. at 805.
220. See generally Note, Title VII and Postiudgment Class Actions, 47 IND. LJ.
350, 363-64 (1972); Note, Federal Civil Procedure-Judicially Directed Conversion to
Class Action After Judgment, 18 WAYNE L. REV. 853, 862-63 (1972).
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rather than individual injuries, and the form of the requested remedy
may not be the same. Finally, the filing of a class suit tolls the statute
of limitations for the claims of the entire class, while the filing of an
individual action as a "test case' may not.221
Thus, the majority of class action cases will still be subject to the
notice provisions that are presently set forth in revised Rule 23. But
these notice provisions operate to defeat rather than promote the pur-
poses the Rule was intended to achieve. In actions maintained under
subsections (b)(1) and (b)(2) of the Rule, notice is not required.
Consequently due process does not permit absent class members to be
bound by the judgment, and the opposing party has no way of protec-
ting himself against the possibility of repetitious litigation over ques-
tions already once decided. in actions maintained under subsection
(b)(3) of the Rule, the representative party is required to pay the ex-
pense of providing notice to the absent class members. Consequently,
small claimants will be deterred from obtaining redress for their injuries
by the disproportionate expense of bringing suit. This inconsistency
between the provisions of the Rule and the purposes it was intended
to achieve may have been acceptable at the time the Rule was adopted
in 1966, for mutality of estoppel was still the law in the federal courts.
But that doctrine has now been abolished, and no reason exists today
for maintaining the Rule in its unsatisfactory state.
The principal change necessary to make the notice provisions of
Rule 23 consistent with its modem purposes is to eliminate the concept
of mandatory notice to absent class members. Mandatory notice carries
with it the requirement that the costs of that notice must be imposed
on one of the parties before the court. Imposing the costs of notice
on the representative party, however, shuts the courthouse door on the
very persons the Rule was intended to benefit-claimants whose in-
dividual damages are too small to warrant the expense of litigation.22
221. The Third Circuit assumed in Katz that a test case would operate in the same
manner as a class action for the purpose of tolling the statute of limitations for the
claims of absent class members. See 496 F.2d at 760-61.
222. Justice Douglas suggests that under revised Rule 23 the representative party can
avoid the problem of excessive notice costs by narrowing the scope of the class, as by
including within it only those persons who were injured during a limited period of time.
See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 179-83 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting
in part). He notes, however, that this solution would raise difficult new questions as
to whether the statute of limitations would be tolled for persons who could have been
included in the class but were omitted for the purpose of minimizing notice costs, and
as to whether persons who were omitted from the class would nevertheless be able to
assert the class judgment against the opposing party as collateral estoppel. See id. at
181-82.
A question of even greater difficulty would arise in class suits which seek predomi-
nately injunctive relief, as in actions alleging violations of civil and constitutional rights.
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The alternative of imposing the costs of notice on the party opposing
the class may deprive that party of his property without due process,
for there will often be a substantial likelihood that he cannot recover
his expenses if he prevails because the class representatives are impe-
cunious.228 Furthermore, even if the costs of notice were to be im-
posed upon the opposing party, potential litigants would likely be
discouraged from bringing suit by the knowlege that should they lose
they would be required to reimburse the opposing party for the sub-
stantial expenses he sustains. 2 4
Instead, notice to absent class members should be at the option
and nonrecoverable expense of the party opposing the class in all ac-
tions maintained under the Rule. Such a provision would accommo-
date the interests of all the parties and promote the modem purposes
of the federal class action device to the greatest extent permissible un-
der the constitutional limitations of due process. The small claimant
would not be precluded from filing his suit by the threatened imposi-
tion of litigation costs which are prohibitively high in relation to his pos-
sible recovery. He would be able to find an attorney willing to prose-
cute his suit, for the attorney's fee would be measured by the benefit
conferred upon the entire class through operation of the judgment as
res judicata if the opposing party elects to send notice, or as collateral
estoppel if he does not. The class representative and the opposing
party would each know the extent of possible liability before they were
required to plan their litigation strategies and present their evidence.
The interests of absent class members would be protected, for they
would be given an opportunity to participate in the litigation if the op-
posing party elects to send notice,221 5 and they would not be bound by
If a number of such suits could be brought against the same party by persons who have
limited the size of each class in order to avoid excessive notice costs, the judgments in
the separate actions may impose incompatible standards of conduct on the party oppos-
ing the class, a result which Rule 23 was intended to avoid. See Advisory Comm. Note,
supra note 3, at 100. Thus, while an artificial separation of a class into subclasses based
on factors other than common issues of law or fact may perhaps be an acceptable solu-
tion to the problem of excessive notice costs in a consumer class action, it would be
entirely unsatisfactory in class suits arising from injuries for which equitable relief is
required. Consequently, there is a need for a more comprehensive change in the pres-
ent perspective of the class suit than that set forth by Justice Douglas.
223. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005, 1020 (1973) (Hays, J., con-
curring); cf. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (statute permitting prejudgment
seizure of defendant's property held to violate due process). But see Note, Managing
the Large Class Action: Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 87 HARv. L. REv. 426, 444, 444
n.l11, 445 n.114 (1973).
224. See also Note, Managing the Large Class Action: Eisen V. Carlisle & Jacquelin,
87 HARv. L. Rv. 426, 442 (1973).
225. In actions maintained under subsection (b) (3) of revised Rulo 23 absent class
members are given the right to request exclusion from the judgment. This right was
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an adverse judgment if he does not. Finally, the opposing party would
be free to weigh his interests in avoiding repetitious litigation by en-
suring that the judgment was conclusive with respect to the claims of
all absent class members against the expense of providing notice, and
to choose the alternative he prefers. Since it is only the opposing party
who benefits from the provision of notice to absent class members,226
it is fair that he should bear the entire burden of its expense.
Any forthcoming revision to Rule 23 should also be accompanied
by a clear and cogent statement by the Advisory Committee of the pur-
poses the Rule is intended to accomplish after the change, together with
a full explanation of the basis envisioned by the Advisory Committee
for giving the class judgment binding effect. Many of the difficulties
that the courts have encountered in interpreting and applying the pres-
ent Rule must ultimately be attributed to the uncommendable failure
of the Advisory Committee to provide adequate guidance in these re-
spects.
believed necessary in order to avoid infringing upon strong interests that individual class
members may have in pursuing their own litigations separately. Advisory Comm. Note,
supra note 3, at 104-05. Granting absent class members this right seems unwise, how-
ever, for it defeats the Rule's purpose of avoiding repetitious litigation. Class members
who request exclusion are free to "institute separate actions which might produce the
'inconsistent or varying adjudications' which Rule 23 is designed to prevent." Brandt
v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 62 F.R.D. 160, 167-68 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). The opposing party
is unable to ensure that the judgment will operate as res judicata with respect to the
claims of absent class members if they have the right to request exclusion, and they will
be free to sit on the sidelines with impunity, knowing that they will not be bound by
an unfavorable judgment, but that they will be able to assert a favorable judgment as
collateral estoppel. Note, Proposed Rule 23: Class Actions Reclassified, 51 VA. L.
Rnv. 629, 652-54 (1965). But see Wright, Class Actions, 47 F.R.D. 169, 181 (1970);
Note, Revised Federal Rule 23, Class Actions: Surviving Difficulties and New Problems
Require Further Amendment, 52 MINN. L. Rnv. 509, 525-26 (1967). In order to fulfill
the Rule's purpose, when the opposing party elects to send notice in order to obtain a
greater degree of protection against subsequent suits than that afforded by the principle
of stare decisis, the alternatives of absent class members should be limited to entering
an appearance in the action through their own counsel or acquiescing to representation
of their interests by the parties before the court.
226. The representative party gains no benefit from the provision of notice to absent
class members. Since a class judgment can be asserted by the absent members as col-
lateral estoppel, the representative party can bring an action on behalf of the absent
members even when notice is not provided and the absent members are free to elect not
to be bound by the judgment if it should be adverse. The argument that the representa-
tive party should pay for notice because it is he who benefits by being able to maintain
the class action to redress his claim fails to recognize that there is no necessary relation-
ship between the ability of the representative party to bring the action on behalf of ab-
sent class members and the binding effect the judgment must have upon the absent mem-
bers.
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Conclusion
Revised Federal Rule 23 was intended to provide a group remedy
for redressing individual injuries of a common nature which would
otherwise be too small to warrant a lawsuit, and to avoid repetitious
litigation over questions already once decided. These purposes have
not been accomplished. One reason is that the courts have experi-
enced confusion over the relationship of the notice requirements in the
Rule to the binding effect that is to be given the class judgment. This
confusion exists because the traditional basis for holding absent class
members bound by a class judgment can no longer be applied. His-
torically, absent class members were held to be parties before the court
through the application of a legal fiction that they had delegated the
class representatives to act as agents on their behalf. Today, in order
for a class judgment to operate as res judicata with respect to the claims
and defenses of the class members not actually before the court, these
class members must be provided with notice and an opportunity to be
heard. Because of this requirement, some courts have refused to per-
mit class actions in cases alleging violations of civil rights and in similar
cases where the class members are numerous and cannot be readily
identified. If modem principles of collateral estoppel were incorpor-
ated into the Rule, however, absent class members could assert a judg-
ment favorable to their interests against the opposing party, even
though those class members had not received notice of the proceeding
and would therefore not be similarly bound if the judgment had been
adverse to their interests. Recent Supreme Court decisions indicate
that a revision to the notice requirements of the Rule based upon these
principles would satisfy due process and fundamental concepts of fair-
ness.
2%7
The Supreme Court's interpretation of the Rule as requiring the
class representatives to bear the cost of the notice presently required
by the Rule also serves to discourage small claimants from filing class
suits, and further defeats the purposes of the Rule. To impose manda-
tory notice costs on the opposing party would not solve the problem,
however, for the class representatives would still be faced with the pos-
sibility that if they lost they may be required to reimburse the oppos-
ing party for those costs. A question would also be raised as to whether
the opposing party is being deprived of his property without due proc-
ess.
These considerations demand that Rule 23 be changed so that no-
rice is no longer mandatory in actions maintained under subsection (b)
(3) of the Rule and discretionary in actions maintained under subsec-
227. See notes 194-95, 200-04, and accompanying text supra.
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tions (b)(1) and (b)(2). The Rule should provide that notice is at
the option .and nonrecoverable expense of the party opposing the class.
This change would permit the Rule to accommodate the interests of the
class representatives, the absent class members, and the opposing party
to the greatest extent permissible under the constitutional limitations of
due process. The judgment would operate as res judicata with respect
to the claims of absent class members if the opposing party elects to
send notice, or as collateral estoppel if he does not. Therefore a favor-
able judgment would confer a benefit upon the entire class. Attorney's
fees, which are measured by the extent of the benefit, would be suffi-
cient to enable the class representatives to find an attorney willing to
prosecute the suit. The interests of absent class members would be pro-
tected, for they would be given an opportunity to participate in the litiga-
tion if the opposing party elects to send notice, and would not be bound
by an adverse judgment if he does not. Finally, the option given to the
opposing party of providing notice to the class permits him to protect
himself against repetitious litigation over questions already once decided.
This change would make the notice requirements of the Rule logically
consistent with the purposes the modem class action device was intended
to achieve.
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